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A core question in the social sciences is whether culture, political 
power, or networks explain economic outcomes. Two important lines 
of research have provided distinct answers to this question. Economic 
sociology has argued that the main determinants of economic outcomes 
are interactions among economic actors and the culture and networks 
that coordinate and enable them. In contrast, comparative political eco-
nomics has asserted that the state’s power is the main determinant of 
economic outcomes. Many empirical analyses have substantiated the 
merit of both these forces—society and state—in shaping economic 
outcomes.
What is the relative importance of the society and the state in deter-
mining economic outcomes? Do culture and social networks on the one 
hand, or the state’s power on the other, shape behavior and outcomes? 
Do rules regulating economic behavior refl ect interactions among 
economic or political actors? Addressing these questions promises to 
enhance our understanding of the determinants of economic outcomes.
In micro terms, these questions ask, “What causes people to take the 
actions they do? Is behavior culturally driven or formal-rule-driven? 
What are the relationships between behavior that refl ects cultural 
beliefs, norms, and networks, and behavior that refl ects formal rules, 
laws, and procedures?” To advance toward addressing these questions, 
we need to have a theory of action, which this chapter presents, that 
accommodates both formal-rule and culturally driven behavior.
First the chapter asks why economic institutionalists—who in the 
past considered only formal-rule-driven behavior—have developed a 
theory of institutionalized behavior that also accommodates culturally 
driven behavior. The chapter then, in the following two sections, pres-
Ch4Greif.indd   57 11/4/2016   12:48:12 PM
58   Greif
ents this theory and the associated theory of institutional dynamic.1 This 
presentation highlights the variety of interrelationships between formal-
rule and culturally driven behavior. In the section following that, the 
chapter then provides some empirical examples of the importance of 
these interrelationships. These examples particularly suggest that cul-
ture infl uences the sources and details of formal rules, while the result-
ing rules further reinforce the cultural aspects that they embody and 
refl ect. The conclusion is a discussion of some of the implied research 
questions.
INSTITUTIONS AS RULES AND CONTRACTS
According to institutional economists, behavior refl ects institu-
tions. Until the early 1990s, these economists’ main approach to posi-
tive institutional analysis defi ned institutions as either rules or contrac-
tual relationships. This approach, dating back to Adam Smith, posits 
that the operation of markets is the key to growth (Smith [1776] 1991), 
and that their operation depends on a clear specifi cation of property 
rights (Coase 1960). The most important rules, therefore, are those that 
allocate property rights (North 1981). Given an allocation of property 
rights, economic agents use contracts and establish organizations to 
minimize the transaction costs of exchange (Coase 1937; Williamson 
1985). Contractual relationships among individuals and within and 
across organizations are established based on the attributes of the rel-
evant transactions in an optimal manner. Distinct property rights alloca-
tions, however, can have distinct effi ciency implications because of the 
transaction costs of transferring rights to those who can use them most 
effi ciently. Rules infl uencing the cost of transferring rights, and more 
generally exchange, are thus important in determining outcomes.
Following Hobbes’s assertion that without a state, life would be 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short,” the emphasis in this chapter 
has been on rules specifi ed and enforced by the state. The state has been 
conceptualized as an entity—a decision maker—with a monopoly over 
coercive power. The rules that the state advances, in turn, refl ect a polit-
ical economy process centered on rules governing collective decision 
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making in organizations, such as Congress, and the political infl uence 
of organizations, such as interest groups and labor unions.2 
The perspective that defi nes institutions as rules that minimize 
transaction costs (henceforth, institutions-as-rules) has contributed a 
great deal to institutional analysis. It is a departure from a long research 
tradition that considered institutions as exogenous and historically 
determined. In contrast, conceptualizing institutions as politically 
determined rules and contractual relationships led to studying them 
as endogenous by examining the political process of rule making and 
the relationship between the attributes of transactions and individu-
als’ choices of contracts. In short, the institutions-as-rules perspective 
advanced institutional analysis by integrating two additional variables 
into the analysis—1) political rules and 2) transactions and their attri-
butes—and by providing analytical frameworks (particularly those of 
political economy and transaction-cost economics) for their analyses.
While the contributions of the institutions-as-rules approach are 
beyond doubt, the approach has serious limitations. For one thing, treat-
ing rules as analogous to behavior limits the scope of the issues the 
approach could address. Why, for example, are some state-mandated 
rules followed but not others? As a fi rst approximation, one can assert 
that individuals follow rules because there are other rules specifying 
punishment if they fail to do so. However, this amounts to pushing the 
question of institutional effectiveness backwards one level. It assumes 
that those who are supposed to enforce the rules are able and moti-
vated to do so. But then who monitors the monitor? A comprehensive 
understanding of the infl uence of state-mandated rules requires exam-
ining how the motivation and ability to follow and enforce them are 
endogenously created. More generally, focusing on rules can only go so 
far toward understanding the relationship between the environment and 
behavior. Why are some behavioral rules followed while others are not? 
Rules are behavioral instructions that can be ignored, implying that for 
any prescriptive rules of behavior to have an impact, individuals must 
be motivated to follow them.
More generally, examining endogenous motivation is necessary for 
studying a host of critical issues, because motivation mediates between 
the environment and behavior. In past and contemporary economies, 
social order characterized by exchange and property rights security has 
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often been achieved in situations in which the state was only partially 
effective, if at all.
Such situations prevail when there is no state, when the economic 
agents expect the state to expropriate rather than protect their property, 
and when the state is unwilling or unable to provide the enforcement 
required for exchange and securing property rights, because of such 
factors as asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, legal costs, or 
organizational limitations. Studying economic outcomes in these situ-
ations requires examining social norms where motivation is endoge-
nously created through the interactions among the economic agents. To 
understand the institutional foundations of markets, we need to exam-
ine private-order institutions based on social norms and their interrela-
tionships with public-order institutions provided by the state.
Similarly, studying the state itself—and, more generally, the pol-
ity—requires that we consider endogenous motivation. (Henceforth, 
I use the terms state and polity interchangeably.) The institution-as-
rules approach adopted Max Weber’s defi nition of the state as having 
a monopoly over coercive power. But in reality, political actors can, 
and sometimes do, resort to violence and invest in obtaining coercive 
power, the use of which leads to political disorder or overturning the 
state. The welfare implications of political order or disorder, and exactly 
how political order is achieved, are immense. Similarly, understand-
ing the impact of the state on economic behavior necessitates examin-
ing the motivation of its agents. The effectiveness of state-mandated 
rules depends on two things: 1) the endogenous provision of motiva-
tion to agents in the bureaucracy and 2) the legal system responsible 
for enforcing them. An analysis of political order and the behavior of 
the state’s agents must view the behavior of its political agents and the 
state’s agents as endogenous outcomes rather than exogenous. Examin-
ing the institutional foundations of the state is therefore necessary.
In short, the institutions-as-rules approach has not provided an 
appropriate framework for studying the endogenous provision of moti-
vation to follow a particular rule of behavior. Yet studying endogenous 
motivation is central to understanding social order, political order, and 
the effectiveness of the state in infl uencing the behavior of its subjects 
and agents.
Similarly, neither the view of institutions as rules nor reliance on 
the political economy and on analytical frameworks that looked at the 
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effi ciency of contracting proved satisfactory in studying institutional 
dynamics. Political economy concentrates on the formation of rules 
within the political system. It postulates that rules governing economic 
life change when the lawmakers consider the benefi ts of changing them 
to be larger than the costs. Transaction-cost economics argues that con-
tractual and organizational forms are altered in response to technologi-
cally determined changes in the attributes of transactions designed to 
optimize transaction costs. The merits of these insights notwithstand-
ing, they nevertheless fall short of accounting for why societies often 
fail to adopt the institutions of more economically successful societies, 
and why they evolve along distinct trajectories of institutional develop-
ment. Arguably, this is the case because the institutions-as-rules frame-
work does not consider how and why institutions enable, guide, and 
affect behavior in addition to constraining it.
Studying endogenous motivation and how institutions enable and 
guide behavior, however, promises to further the examination of the 
questions regarding institutional dynamics that are at the heart of social 
science and history. Is institutional dynamics a historical process in 
which past institutions infl uenced the rate and direction of institutional 
change? If so, why and how do we study this historical process? These 
questions have bedeviled institutional analysis in economics, politi-
cal science, and sociology for a long time, because addressing them 
requires simultaneously accounting for stability, change, and the infl u-
ence of the past on subsequent outcomes (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; 
North 1990; Scott 1995; Thelen 1999).
INSTITUTIONS: A DEFINITION
In response to these concerns, it has become apparent that we 
need to study institutions from a broader, socioeconomic perspective 
that captures the role of institutions not only as motivating but also as 
enabling and guiding behavior.3 The resulting approach goes beyond 
the economic and political variables emphasized in the institutions-as-
rules approach. Instead, it focuses more generally on the behavioral 
implications of factors that are social by virtue of being man-made, 
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nonphysical factors that are exogenous to each individual whose behav-
ior they infl uence.4 
An institution is a system of social factors that conjointly generate 
a regularity of behavior (in a social situation).5 Together, these factors 
motivate, enable, and guide individuals in various social positions to 
follow one behavior among the many that are technologically feasible 
in social situations.6 (It is convenient to refer to such social factors as 
institutional elements.) Analysis of institutions from this perspective 
emphasizes the importance of rules, beliefs, and norms as well as their 
manifestation as organizations. Thus, we can slightly adapt the word-
ing of our defi nition at the beginning of this paragraph to say that an 
institution is a system of rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations that 
conjointly generates a regularity of (social) behavior. Each of these ele-
ments satisfi es the conditions stated above.
Considering an institution as a system departs from the common 
practice of considering it a monolithic entity such as a rule.7 Yet to 
understand regularities of behavior in the most general case, we need 
to study a system of interrelated elements, because in an institution, 
different elements have distinct roles. Each has a distinct contribution 
to generating regularities of behavior. Rules specify norms and pro-
vide a shared cognitive system, coordination, and information, whereas 
beliefs and norms provide the motivation to follow these rules, whether 
this behavior is rational, imitative, or habitual. Organizations, whether 
formal, such as parliaments and fi rms, or informal, such as communities 
and business networks, have three interrelated roles: they 1) produce 
and disseminate rules, 2) perpetuate beliefs and norms, and 3) infl uence 
the set of feasible behavioral beliefs. In situations where institutions 
generate behavior, rules correspond to the beliefs and norms that moti-
vated the behavior, while organizations contribute to this outcome in 
the manner mentioned above.
How, for example, do regularities of behavior prevail among driv-
ers? The rules of the road create a shared cognitive understanding of the 
symbols drivers encounter (red lights, yield signs) and defi nitions of 
various concepts and situations (passing, yielding, having the right-of- 
way). Rules also include prescriptive instructions on expected behavior 
in various situations by individuals with different social positions, such 
as law enforcement offi cials, pedestrians, and other drivers. The belief 
that others will follow these rules of behavior motivates most drivers 
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most of the time to follow them also, and thus regularities of behavior 
are generated. Motor vehicle departments and law enforcement agen-
cies are organizations that generate and disseminate these rules and 
facilitate the creation of the corresponding beliefs. To comprehend 
drivers’ behavior requires studying the three institutional elements that 
constitute the interrelated components of an integrated system in which 
rules correspond to beliefs about behavior and the behavior itself.
In this conceptualization of institutions, socially articulated and dis-
seminated rules are central in providing individuals with the cognitive, 
coordinative, and informational microfoundations of behavior. These 
social rules provide an individual with the information and the cogni-
tive model (mental models or internalized belief system) required to 
choose or mimic behavior. Similarly, social rules coordinate behavior 
by providing a public signal regarding the behavior that is expected of 
individuals in various circumstances. In short, social rules constitute the 
heuristics that enable and guide behavior by helping individuals form 
beliefs about the world around them and what to expect from it.
Commonly known social rules enable and guide behavior, and ret-
rospective individuals with limited rationality and cognition respond to 
them. On the one hand, each individual takes the cognitive, coordina-
tive, and informational content of institutionalized rules as a given; he 
responds to, or plays against, the rules, accepting them as they are. On 
the other hand, because each individual responds to these rules based on 
his private information, knowledge, and preferences, these rules aggre-
gate information and knowledge and distribute it in a compressed form.
The only social rules that can be institutionalized—that can be con-
sidered to be common knowledge, expected to be followed, and that 
correspond to behavior—are those that each individual, by and large, 
fi nds optimal to follow given his private information, knowledge, and 
preference. In situations in which institutions generate behavior, insti-
tutionalized rules and the associated beliefs and norms correspond to 
self-enforcing behavior. Finally, because behavior corresponds to the 
institutionalized rules and associated beliefs, these rules and beliefs are 
reproduced—not refuted—by behavior.
In situations in which institutions generate behavior, institutional-
ized rules, the corresponding beliefs regarding causal relationships and 
others’ behavior, and the behavior that these beliefs motivate, consti-
tute an equilibrium. A structure made up of institutionalized rules and 
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beliefs enables, guides, and motivates the self-enforcing behavior that 
reproduces it. Most individuals, most of the time, follow the behavior 
that is expected of them.
The discussion so far has ignored the social and normative founda-
tions of behavior. But humans are social, moral creatures whose behav-
ior is also shaped by the impact of institutions on the social and moral 
underpinnings of behavior. Everything else being equal, people seek to 
act in a manner that generates positive social responses from the people 
they know, elevates their social status and esteem in the broader society, 
provides them with an identity, and is consistent with their (internalized) 
norms.8 In modern sociology, the argument over the behavioral impor-
tance of social exchange, belief in others’ social responses, or the loss 
of esteem following a particular action is associated with Granovetter 
(1985), Homans (1961), and Wrong 1999. Another line of research, 
associated with Parsons (1951), emphasizes the importance of norms in 
motivating behavior by infl uencing intrinsic utility.9 Internalization of 
norms, or the incorporation of behavioral standards into one’s superego, 
essentially means to develop an internal system of sanctions that sup-
ports the same behavior as the external system.10 In this theory, “values 
and norms were regarded as the basis of a stable social order” (Scott 
1995, p. 40).11 
The extension of the above discussion to incorporate these impor-
tant considerations is straightforward. Extending the analysis to incor-
porate social considerations, for example, recognizes that individuals 
care about others’ perceptions of them and hence are motivated by 
beliefs regarding these perceptions. In institutionalized situations, such 
beliefs constitute an equilibrium in these social relationships, given the 
social and materialistic implications of various technologically possible 
actions.
For a long time, the diffi culty of analytically and empirically study-
ing institutions from this equilibrium perspective was due to the dual 
nature of social factors as endogenous to society yet exogenous to 
each of the individuals whose behavior they infl uence. Their analy-
sis therefore has had to combine two seemingly contradictory views 
of institutions. The fi rst is the “agency” view, common in economics 
and political economy, which emphasizes that institutions are produced 
by individuals to constrain behavior. These are “the humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions” 
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(North 1990, p. 97). In contrast, the second, called the “structural” view 
of institutions, is common in sociology and emphasizes that institutions 
transcend individual actors. Institutions enable and motivate behavior 
while constituting the properties of societies that “impose themselves 
upon” individuals (Durkheim [1895] 1950, p. 2), and they “consist of 
cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that pro-
vide stability and meaning to social behavior” (Scott 1995, p. 33).
The diffi culty of developing an analytical framework that could 
bridge the agency and structural views proved daunting to those who 
advocated integrating factors such as beliefs and norms into institu-
tional analysis. Durkheim ([1895] 1950, p. 45), for example, defi ned 
institutions as “all the beliefs and modes of behavior instituted by the 
collectivity,” while Parsons (1951, pp. 38–40) has taken the position 
that full institutionalization of a behavioral standard requires its inter-
nalization—namely, its transformation into a norm. Yet, since they 
have not combined the agency and structural views, they have not pro-
posed a way to analytically restrict the set of admissible beliefs and 
norms. Hence, because beliefs and norms are not directly observable, 
any behavior can be justifi ed based on ad hoc assertions regarding the 
beliefs and norms that motivated it.
In recent years, however, analytical frameworks and empirical meth-
ods suitable for studying institutions from an equilibrium perspective 
have been developed. They rely extensively on microlevel models that 
enable researchers, particularly by using classical, experimental, and 
evolutionary game theory, to restrict the set of admissible institutional-
ized outcomes in social situations.12 The related empirical frameworks 
mostly use context-specifi c case studies that utilize models to capture 
the particularities of the transactions under consideration and recognize 
the importance of the broader institutional context and history.13
INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS AS A HISTORICAL PROCESS
The study of the dynamics of institutions has gone through three 
phases in economics. Traditionally, economic institutions were consid-
ered immutable cultural features. In the 1970s, the “new institutional 
economics” challenged this view. It considered them as rules, organiza-
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tions, contractual forms, or patterns of behavior and employed the tools 
of microeconomic theory to argue that institutions change in response 
to environmental changes. Property rights, contracts, and behavior, for 
example, would adjust to changes in relative prices in an optimal man-
ner or in a way that best served those who dictated rules or chose con-
tracts. More recently, attention has been given to factors causing insti-
tutions to exhibit path-dependence. This view emphasizes that once a 
particular institution prevails, it will tend to perpetuate itself in a chang-
ing environment because of such factors as sunken costs in specifying 
rules, learning effects, or activities of the interest groups to which the 
existing rules give rise.
Endogenous Institutional Change
Recognizing the distinction between an institution and institutional 
elements and studying institutions from an equilibrium perspective 
highlight why and how institutional dynamics is a historical process in 
which past institutions infl uence the rate and direction of institutional 
change. Analytically examining institutions as self-enforcing captures 
how particular beliefs, norms, and behavior can reproduce each other 
and hence the institution. Beliefs and norms motivate behavior, and 
observed behavior confi rms the relevance of beliefs and the appro-
priateness of the norms that led to this behavior. Taken together, self-
enforcing beliefs, norms, and behavior are in a steady-state equilibrium. 
The analysis thereby exposes which exogenous changes in the environ-
ment or knowledge bring this reproduction process to an end.
Studying institutions as self-enforcing and reproducing does not 
seem to be a promising starting point for studying endogenous institu-
tional dynamics. After all, if all beliefs and behavior are self-enforcing 
and confi rmed by their observable implications, one would imagine that 
all changes must have an exogenous origin. However, this is not the 
case. A theory of institutional stability facilitates studying how institu-
tions can endogenously change.
An institution is reinforcing (undermining) when its implica-
tions, beyond behavior in the governed transaction, (weakly) increase 
(decrease) the range of situations (parameters) in which the behavior 
associated with the institution is self-enforcing. Reinforcing processes 
can refl ect, for example, individuals’ intentional responses to the incen-
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tives the institution entails, or the unintentional feedback from behav-
ior to factors that infl uence behavior in the situation under consider-
ation, such as preference and habit formation, knowledge, information, 
demography, ideology, wealth distribution, political power, or social 
networks.
To illustrate this idea, consider the following example. Suppose that 
belief regarding collective punishment within a community leads to a 
particular regularity of behavior (e.g., as in Greif [1993]). To study the 
institution, we must examine this community, its beliefs, and its behav-
ioral rules as a self-enforcing system of institutional elements that gen-
erated this behavior. We must examine why each member of the com-
munity is endogenously motivated to retain his membership in it, why 
he holds these beliefs, follows the behavioral rules, and participates in 
collective punishment. But even when this is the case at a particular 
point in time, the institution can still undermine itself. For example, 
the economic success of the community implied by collective punish-
ment may lead to its growth over time. This can undermine the self-
enforceability of beliefs in collective punishment, because information 
transmission within a larger group may be too slow to deter deviation. 
Similarly, each member of the community can become, over time, suf-
fi ciently wealthy so that the threat of communal punishment will no 
longer be enough to make past patterns of behavior self-enforcing.
The argument can be seen more clearly by resorting to a game-
theoretic framework. The game-theoretic analysis of institutions 
focuses on studying the relationships between the rules of the game 
and how regularities of behavior—cooperation, wars, political mobili-
zation, social unrest—affect the particular transaction under consider-
ation. When we say that an institution is self-enforcing, we mean that 
the behavior and expected behavior in the transaction under consider-
ation corresponds to an equilibrium. Yet, an institution usually has other 
ramifi cations that go beyond the behavior it implies in the transaction 
under consideration. Institutions infl uence factors such as wealth, iden-
tity, ability, knowledge, beliefs, residential distribution, and occupa-
tional specialization that are usually assumed as parametric in the rules 
of the game.
Although it is not possible to prove that institutions generally have 
such ramifi cations, it is diffi cult to think of any institution that in the 
long run does not have implications beyond the behavior in the trans-
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action it governs. In the game-theoretical framework, this infl uence 
implies a dynamic adjustment of variables that, had this infl uence been 
ignored, would have been considered as parameters in the stage game.
Game theorists have long recognized that game theory does not pre-
dict a behavioral change following a parametric change. If a strategy 
combination is an equilibrium, it will generically be an equilibrium in 
some parameter set. As long as the actual parameters are in this set, 
game theory does not predict that the associated beliefs and behavior 
will not prevail. Indeed, as Schelling’s (1960) seminal work on focal 
points reminds us, there are good reasons for individuals to continue 
to follow past patterns of behavior even under conditions of marginal 
parametric change. This is the case for at least three interrelated rea-
sons: 1) knowledge, 2) attention, and 3) coordination.
Recall that institutionalized rules constitute an equilibrium in 
individuals’ responses to them. They not only assist individuals when 
choosing behavior, but they also aggregate, in equilibrium, each indi-
vidual’s dispersed information. In other words, these rules not only 
provide individuals with the information they need to make decisions 
regarding how to act, they also aggregate the information privately held 
by each decision maker. Institutional rules similarly refl ect and embody 
knowledge. The information compressed in socially transmitted rules 
permits individuals without knowledge of all the relevant parameters 
and causal mechanisms, and with limited computational ability, to act 
in a manner that leads to equilibrium behavior. Because individuals 
do not observe the relevant parameters and lack full comprehension 
of causal relationships—because they play against a social rule rather 
than follow the rules of the game—the best they can do is perceive the 
world as stationary as long as observations (including those conveyed 
through others’ behavior) do not contradict this perception.
Regarding the above implies that the persistence of past behav-
ior despite marginal parametric changes occurs because institutional-
ized rules enable individuals with limited knowledge and information 
to choose behavior. Behavioral rules learned in the past are the best 
predictors of future behavior. As long as the behavior of others does 
not refl ect a change in the parameters or causal relations that one does 
not observe, one will not change his own behavior, either. Similarly, 
acquiring additional knowledge is demanding. An observed marginal 
parametric shift is not likely to induce decision makers to devote the 
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necessary cognitive resources to consider whether to change their own 
behavior. People don’t stop to consider the optimal response to every 
choice they make in their lives (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).
Past patterns persist as well because what one sees, knows, and 
understands in a given situation also refl ects the amount of attention 
one devotes to the task. Attention is a scarce resource. Institutionalized 
rules come to the rescue. They enable one to choose behavior in com-
plicated situations without paying much attention, so that one’s limited 
attention resources can be devoted to decision making in noninstitu-
tionalized situations. Because we pay little attention to institutional-
ized situations, parametric shifts that might have been noted, had more 
attention been devoted to observing them, may go unnoticed, further 
contributing to the lack of behavioral change in response to marginal 
parametric changes. Moreover, those who do observe parametric shifts 
and bring this to the attention of others may have little incentive for 
doing so. People will be induced to devote attention to a situation only 
if the behavior or observed outcomes of others differ suffi ciently from 
the expected.
Coordination failure is the third reason a marginal parametric shift 
does not necessarily lead to behavioral change. When one observes that 
a situation marginally changes, the problem arises of how to behave 
in the new situation, given the multiplicity of self-enforcing behav-
iors. Because people do not share expectations that a new equilibrium 
behavior will be followed, they are likely to rely on past rules of behav-
ior to guide them and continue to follow past patterns of self-enforcing 
behavior. With that expectation, one is likely to continue following the 
past patterns of self-enforcing behavior as well.
Coordination problems prevail even when there are individuals and 
organizations with the ability to coordinate on new behavior. There 
are many reasons for even benefi cial coordination to fail to transpire. 
Sunken costs associated with coordinating change, free-rider problems, 
distributional issues, uncertainties, limited understanding of alterna-
tives, and asymmetric information can all hinder coordination on new 
behavior.
Hence, the many features that are usually taken as parameters in the 
repeated game formulation share two properties: fi rst, they can gradu-
ally be altered by the implications of the institution under study, and 
second, their marginal changes will not necessarily cause the behavior 
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associated with that institution to change. These two properties imply 
that we can consider them as parametric—exogenous and fi xed—when 
studying the self-enforcing property of an institution in the short run, 
but we must consider them as endogenous and variable when studying 
the same institutions in the long run. These features can be referred to as 
“quasi-parameters.” We can ignore their long-run implications in study-
ing self-enforceability when these long-run implications are not ex ante 
recognized or appropriately understood and in situations in which such 
recognition will not infl uence behavior in the short run for the reasons 
stated above.
Changes to an institution’s quasi-parameters can reinforce or under-
mine it. An institution reinforces itself when, over time, the changes in 
the quasi-parameters it entails imply that the associated behavior is self-
enforcing in a larger set of situations (parameters) than would otherwise 
have been the case. A self-enforcing institution that reinforces itself is 
known as a “self-reinforcing institution.” But a self-enforcing institu-
tion can also undermine itself when the changes in the quasi-parameters 
it entails imply that the associated behavior will be self-enforcing in a 
smaller set of situations.
The dynamics of self-enforcing beliefs and behavior are therefore 
central to endogenous institutional changes. An institutional change is 
one of changing beliefs, and it occurs when the associated behavior is 
no longer self-enforcing and leads individuals to act in a manner that 
does not reproduce the associated beliefs.14 Undermining processes can 
cause previously self-enforcing behavior to cease being so, leading to 
institutional change. A suffi cient condition for endogenous institutional 
change is that the institution’s implications constantly undermine the 
associated behavior. Conversely, a necessary condition for an institu-
tion to prevail over time is that the types of situations in which the 
associated behavior is self-enforcing do not decrease over time: the 
institution’s behavioral implications must reinforce it, at least weakly. 
Hence, unless an institution is (weakly) self-reinforced, it will even-
tually reach a point where its associated behavior is no longer self-
enforcing. Endogenous institutional change will follow.
Considering reinforcement highlights the importance of another, 
indirect way in which an institution endogenously infl uences its own 
change—when it infl uences the magnitude and nature of the exogenous 
shocks that are necessary to cause the associated beliefs and behavior 
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to change. When an institution reinforces itself, its associated behav-
ior does not change. But the reinforced institution is nevertheless more 
robust than the previous one. The behavior associated with it will be 
self-enforcing even in situations where this would not have been the 
case previously. The opposite holds true in cases where an institution 
undermines itself. An institution, whether by reinforcing or by under-
mining itself, indirectly infl uences its rate of change by determining the 
size of the external parametric change required to render its associated 
behavior as no longer self-enforcing.
Institutions can change because of endogenous processes, exog-
enous shocks, and combinations of both. The exact mechanism that 
brings about institutional change, once the associated institutional 
behavior is no longer self-enforcing, depends on the nature of the quasi-
parameters that delimit self-reinforcement. If these quasi-parameters 
are observable and their importance well understood, decision makers 
may actually realize that past behavior is no longer self-enforcing, and 
institutional change will be intentional. Intentional selection of alter-
native behavior, specifi cation of new rules through collective decision 
making, and the intentional introduction of organizations are common 
manifestations of the ways in which intentional selection comes about.
But an institution can cease to be self-enforcing because of changes 
in quasi-parameters that are unobservable, uncertain, and unrecogniz-
able. In such cases, the mechanism of institutional change is likely to 
be unintentional. It may refl ect individuals’ willingness to experiment 
and risk deviating from past behavior, or it may refl ect the actions of a 
few individuals with better knowledge of the situation. In either case, 
learning is slow and institutional change is rare. It may take a long time 
for self-undermining to lead to new behavior.
The Infl uence of Past Institutions on the Direction of 
Institutional Change
Recognizing the distinction between institutions and institutional 
elements provides the basis for studying how past institutions infl uence 
the direction of institutional change. Institutional elements inherited 
from the past, such as shared beliefs, networks, political and economic 
organizations, and internalized norms, transcend the situations that led 
to their emergence. They are what members of a society bring with 
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them to new situations, providing them with the motivation to bring 
about various new situations through technological, organizational, and 
institutional inventions. New institutions do not simply emerge in the 
context of existing ones; they draw on the historical heritage encapsu-
lated in institutional elements inherited from the past.
Past institutional elements infl uence the direction of change because 
there is a fundamental asymmetry between these past institutional ele-
ments and those alternatives that are technologically possible. Past 
institutional elements refl ect and embody shared beliefs and knowledge 
among members of the society and constitute legitimate mechanisms to 
coordinate their actions and expectations. They are embodied in their 
utility functions and shared cognitive understanding of the environ-
ment. Unlike rules of the game that refl ect physical possibilities, past 
institutional elements are properties of individuals and societies. There-
fore they do not vanish once a new situation prevails, but rather they 
infl uence the processes that lead to new institutions. Indeed, relying 
on institutional heritage confi nes the complexity of new problems that 
people face to an order they can cope with.
Hence, new institutions do not refl ect only environmental condi-
tions and the interests of relevant decision makers. They evolve over 
time in a spiral-like manner, building on existing institutional elements. 
For example, communities, networks, and political organizations that 
were formed in the past constitute part of the (“endogenous”) rules of 
the game in new situations. Beliefs that were crystalized in the past and 
embodied within existing institutions become the cultural beliefs that 
individuals bring with them to new situations and infl uence the selec-
tion of new institutions. They are part of the initial conditions in pro-
cesses selecting among alternative self-enforcing behavior and beliefs 
in new situations. Although agents thus act strategically and pursue 
their interests in these processes, they do so within the context implied 
by past institutions. Past institutions and institutional elements present 
both constraints and opportunities to individuals who are attempting to 
pursue their interests in new situations.
Specifi cally, past institutions infl uence the direction of institutional 
change—they impact the details of new institutions—through what can 
be referred to as environmental, coordination, and inclusion effects. 
First, past institutions and institutional elements constitute part of the 
environment within which processes leading to new institutions tran-
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spire. This environment is composed of other institutions and institu-
tional elements (such as marriage or political institutions) that are para-
metric in relation to the new institution. Second, past institutions and 
institutional elements provide the means to coordinate within this envi-
ronment. This coordination may be unintentional, occurring through the 
impact of cultural beliefs inherited from the past (Greif 1994), or inten-
tional, occurring through coordinating organizations inherited from the 
past, such as parliaments or the council of elders. The ability to coor-
dinate, in turn, depends on the norms of legitimacy inherited from the 
past. A legitimate coordinator’s ability to infl uence behavior depends, 
however, on the network and organizations inherited from the past that 
the coordinator can draw on in disseminating the new rules of behavior.
Third, past institutional elements bias the processes leading to 
new institutions. Creating new institutional elements, such as shared 
cognitive systems, shared beliefs, and shared organizations (which 
themselves include such systems and beliefs), is a time-consuming 
and costly endeavor with uncertain results. Similarly, institutions that 
embody existing norms are much more likely to emerge and are easier 
to establish than those that do not.
Consider, for example, two identical societies that differ only in 
their contract-enforcement institutions. In the fi rst, economic exchange 
has always been supported by legal contract enforcement. This society 
has the appropriate legal organizations (a court and a police force), and 
the prevailing belief is that people will not renege on their contrac-
tual obligations because they fear legal sanctions. In the second soci-
ety, however, exchange is supported by an informal collective punish-
ment, a social network for the transmission of information, and a shared 
understanding of what actions constitute a breach of contract. Now sup-
pose that in these two societies a new transaction is possible and in both 
societies it is technologically feasible to govern it, either by legal or 
communal contract-enforcement institutions.
It is intuitive that legal enforcement and communal enforcement 
will be used to govern the new transaction in the fi rst and the second 
societies, respectively. After all, members of the fi rst society share the 
knowledge that the legal system can provide contract enforcement, the 
belief that it will enforce contracts, and the confi dence that the punish-
ment is suffi cient to deter contractual breaches. Introducing an alterna-
tive contract-enforcement institution based on communal punishment 
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would require creating an appropriate network making the members’ 
identity and their past actions common knowledge so that one can be 
punished when necessary.
Furthermore, it would require generating a shared understanding 
of what actions constitute a breach of contract and the belief that indi-
viduals would participate in communal punishment and that the threat 
of such punishment would deter cheating. Yet the process of building 
relationships, knowledge, and reputations is costly, time-consuming, 
and uncertain. Similarly, in the second society, establishing an impartial 
legal system requires much more than knowledge of how to accomplish 
it, hire judges and policemen, and specify a code of conduct: it also 
requires that the system gain a reputation for operating effectively and 
impartially. In other words, people must believe that the legal system 
will function properly.
However, past institutions and institutional elements infl uence but 
do not determine new institutions. This is so because environmental 
factors and functional considerations, such as simplicity, effi ciency, and 
distribution, also direct institutional change. The extent of their infl u-
ence, in turn, depends on institutions inherited from the past. This is 
the case because existing institutions infl uence the institutional transac-
tion costs involved in changing institutional elements inherited from the 
past. Belief in religious law prevailed in the Ottoman Empire but not 
in premodern Japan. Adopting Western laws was correspondingly more 
diffi cult in the former than in the latter. Finally, unless institutional ele-
ments inherited from the past become part of a new self-enforcing insti-
tution, they will decay and vanish over time. Institutions are outcomes 
that emerge from within and interact with the legacy of past institu-
tional elements, but for these elements to persist, they must become a 
part of the new institutions.
This view of institutional evolution as a historical process does not 
deny the importance of agency (the pursuit of institutional change by 
goal-oriented actors) in infl uencing institutional selection. It recog-
nizes, however, that history provides agents—even political agents—
with constraints and opportunities in their ability to infl uence the insti-
tutional dynamic. The past infl uences the future, not because agents are 
passive but because they fi nd it necessary, useful, and desirable to draw 
on the past. They do so to determine the best way to behave in new situ-
ations when intentionally pursuing institutional change, when contem-
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plating the development or adoption of institutional and organizational 
innovations, or when they are engaged in confl icts over institutional 
selection. Analytically, it is possible to capture important aspects of the 
interplay between history and agency by recognizing that past institu-
tions and institutional elements constitute beliefs in and the rules of the 
game within which interactions lead to new institutions (see discussion 
in Greif [2006], Chapter 7).
Past institutional elements are incorporated into new institutions, 
and new institutions emerge within the context of—and hence are com-
plementary to—existing institutions. This implies that they will form 
an institutional complex, which is a set of institutions that govern vari-
ous transactions, share common institutional elements, and are comple-
mentary to each other. The exact attributes of such complexes, in turn, 
also infl uence both the rate and direction of institutional change. These 
attachments determine, for example, the speed and scope of change, 
whether it will be continuous and encompass many institutions, and 
whether new institutions will be more or less likely to include past insti-
tutional elements. This implies the need to study a society’s institutions 
from a holistic, systemic perspective.
This view of institutional dynamics considers endogenous insti-
tutional change and the impact of institutional heritage on individu-
als’ abilities to infl uence the direction of institutional change. As such, 
this view occupies a middle ground between alternative positions. In 
economics, transaction-cost economics assumes that institutions are 
instrumental transaction costs optimizing responses to environmental 
conditions (e.g., Williamson [1985]), but in evolutionary economics it 
is common to identify them with history-dependent, and not necessar-
ily functional, behavior (e.g., Hodgson [1998]). Similarly, in political 
science, rational choice analysis examines institutions as instrumental 
outcomes using equilibrium analysis, while historical institutionalism 
emphasizes that they refl ect a historical process (Thelen 1999).
CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES
The importance of integrating the “cultural” and “social” factors 
into institutional analysis has been recognized by many students of 
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institutions in economics, sociology, and political science (Hall and 
Taylor 1996; North 1990; Scott 1995; Williamson 2000). Yet, as noted 
by Williamson, the social and cultural factors were either ignored or 
taken as exogenous in the institutions-as-rules perspective. Recogniz-
ing that institutions are composed of social factors breaks the conceptual 
divide between studying institutions as formal rules and studying them 
as cultural phenomena. In both cases, behavior is guided and enabled 
by rules providing shared cultural frames, cognition, and behavioral 
instructions; is motivated by beliefs and norms; and is facilitated by 
social structures (such as networks and bureaucracies) and procedures.
Consider, for example, beliefs. Whether behavior is formal-rule 
or culturally driven, one’s choice of behavior is constrained by shared 
beliefs regarding actions that others, such as agents of the state or eco-
nomic agents, will take in various circumstances. In both cases, when 
the underlying situation is one of pure coordination, the institutional-
ized beliefs are self-enforcing. Each decision maker’s best response to 
believing that others will follow the rules is to follow them also. In 
other situations, such as when the underlying situation is characterized 
by a free-rider problem, the behavior specifi ed by the rules is not self-
enforcing. Hence, rules will be followed only if the decision makers 
believe that failing to follow them will entail suffi ciently costly sanc-
tions imposed by the relevant agents. The credibility of the threat of 
punishment and its magnitude are essential.
Yet the sources, and hence the nature of rules, beliefs, and norms, 
differ between the formal-rule-driven and the culturally driven cases. 
Again, consider beliefs. When behavior is formal-rule-driven, the rules 
articulated by the state coordinate on beliefs regarding how others will 
behave. This requires the state to have the organizational capacity to 
generate and disseminate rules and the necessary legitimacy to induce a 
suffi cient number of individuals to believe others will follow the behav-
ior the rules specify.
When behavior is culturally driven, it is motivated by cultural 
beliefs.15 Cultural beliefs are the shared ideas and thoughts that gov-
ern interactions among individuals and between them, their gods, and 
other groups. Cultural beliefs differ from knowledge in that they are 
not empirically discovered or analytically proved. They usually evolve 
spontaneously without purposeful design and become identical and 
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commonly known through the socialization process by which culture is 
unifi ed, maintained, and communicated.
Such differences notwithstanding, recognizing that a unifi ed theory 
of action underlies behavior in both cases highlights the many inter-
relationships between the analysis of formal-rule and culturally driven 
behavior. Indeed, the analysis of each of these cases complements—
rather than substitutes for—the other.
There are two types of interrelationships—1) static and 2) dynamic—
between formal-rule-driven and culturally driven behavior. When study-
ing formal-rule-driven behavior, understanding actions and outcomes 
requires examining the microprocess by which rules and beliefs are 
enacted. After all, if rules specifi ed by the state are to be followed, it is 
not enough for them just to be announced. They must be acted upon by 
the economic agents and, if necessary, enforced by agents of the state. 
The agents’ cultural, social, and organizational attributes and capacities 
thereby will infl uence whether the formal rules will be followed or not. 
The opposite is also true: cultural and social features that were inte-
grated into formal rules are reproduced by the associated behavior. In 
other words, a society’s cultural and organizational aspects are embed-
ded in formal rules that lead to the reproduction of these aspects.
In terms of their dynamic interrelationships, the fundamental asym-
metry implies that the past matters, whether behavior is culturally or 
formal-rule-driven. In either case, beliefs, norms, and social structures 
inherited from the past affect the processes, leading to new institutions. 
In particular, they affect the behavior through which the formal rules 
regulating economic life are enacted, and they have an effect on the 
resulting rules on behavior. Indeed, the process of reaching formal rules 
and the rules that are thereby articulated refl ect a society’s cultural and 
social features.
This historical heritage infl uences politically determined rules, is 
integrated into the resulting institutions, and infl uences the rate and 
direction of subsequent institutional change.
The opposite causal relationships also prevail. Formal rules shape 
culture and social features by infl uencing behavior and incentives. They 
have an impact on the formation of networks and other social structures 
by infl uencing whose interests are aligned, who interacts with whom, 
when, and in what contexts. The associated behavior implies particu-
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lar role models, the motivation to socialize one’s children in a specifi c 
manner, perceptions of fairness, feelings of entitlement, informational 
feedback, and the development of knowledge and beliefs.
To understand economic outcomes, the static and dynamic interplay 
between formal, state-mandated rules and a society’s cultural and social 
features must be examined.16 In particular, the rules articulated by the 
state, and the effectiveness of such rules, refl ect social and cultural fea-
tures inherited from the past. Conversely, past rules infl uence the trajec-
tory of cultural and social development. Ample evidence reveals such 
causal relationships.
The following few examples illustrate the impact of cultural beliefs, 
social structures, and norms on political institutions and the rules the 
state articulates. Cultural beliefs regarding the objectives and intentions 
of various groups in a society infl uence the set of political institutions 
that support political order. In late medieval Genoa, for example, each 
of the city’s two main clans expected the other to be willing to use mili-
tary force to gain control over Genoa if the opportunity arose. These 
beliefs limited their ability to cooperate in the expansion of Genoa’s 
commerce because such expansion threatened to alter the balance of 
military power between them. After a long and costly learning period, 
this problem was mitigated by hiring an outside noble with a military 
force that provided a balance of power among the clans. While suc-
cessful in the short run, this arrangement sustained the beliefs and clan 
structure that made the arrangement necessary (Greif 1998, 2006).
Distinct cultural beliefs create different demands for formal-rule 
behavior supported by state-provided formal contract-enforcement 
institutions. For example, Greif (1994) documented how, during the 
late medieval period, collectivist cultural beliefs among Maghribi trad-
ers led to an economic self-enforcing collective punishment, horizontal 
agency relations, segregation, and an ingroup social communication 
network. In this collectivist society, individuals could be induced to 
forgo “improper” behavior by credibly threatening informal collective 
economic punishment. This implied there was relatively little demand 
for state-provided contract enforcement.
This was not the case among the contemporary Genoese, however. 
Their individualistic cultural beliefs led to an individualist society with 
a vertical and integrated social structure, a relatively low level of com-
munication, and no economic self-enforcing collective punishment. In 
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this society, a relatively low level of informal economic enforcement 
could be achieved because there was an absence of economic self-
enforcing collective punishment and networks for information trans-
mission. Furthermore, the integrated social structure and low level of 
communication hindered social and moral enforcement mechanisms. 
To support collective actions and to facilitate exchange, individualist 
societies need to develop formal enforcement mechanisms. Further-
more, a formal legal code is likely to be required to facilitate exchange 
through coordinating expectations and enhancing the deterrence effect 
of formal organizations.
The impact of cultural beliefs on the role of the state did not end 
in the premodern world. In the nineteenth century, different cultural 
beliefs in America and Germany led to distinct forms of legislation 
and laws regulating the interrelations among corporations. Americans 
believed large corporations were corrupt in nature. They were per-
ceived to be motivated by greed and likely to collude and infl uence 
offi cials to increase their profi ts. Strict antitrust laws and regulations to 
curtail their power were therefore enacted in the United States, but in 
Germany, the opposite view was held. There, corporations were consid-
ered responsible entities whose prosperity would benefi t the nation as 
a whole. Antitrust legislation was absent; indeed, collusive agreements 
were legally binding.
Distinct cultural beliefs regarding the relationship between effort 
and material success have led to different welfare policies in the United 
States and Europe. In the United States, the prevailing belief has been 
that individual effort determines income, and that all have a right to 
enjoy the fruits of their efforts. The political economy outcome has 
therefore been one of low distribution and low taxes. In equilibrium, 
effort is high and the role of luck is indeed limited. Consequently, out-
comes are relatively fair, and beliefs are reproduced. In Europe, how-
ever, the initial beliefs were that luck, birth, connections, and corruption 
determined wealth. The political economy outcome was therefore one 
of high taxation and distorted allocations that reproduced these beliefs 
(Alesina and Angeletos 2005). Platteau and Hayami (1998) argued that 
ineffi cient sharing norms in Africa refl ected the belief that personal gain 
was due to luck and not effort.
The set of rules that a state can effectively enact (and that can be 
followed with relatively low enforcement costs) is limited by legiti-
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macy norms—i.e., norms specifying the confi nes of the domain within 
which the state has regulatory rights over behavior. The failure of Pro-
hibition in the United States, which was in effect between 1920 and 
1933, refl ects more than a love of drinking alcohol. It refl ects the belief 
by individuals that they had the right to consume alcohol and that the 
government was illegitimately regulating its consumption. Prohibition 
is much more effective in some contemporary Muslim countries, where 
different beliefs and norms prevail.
In Muslim countries, legitimacy norms have hindered changes in 
other rules. Consider slavery, for example. Slavery was eliminated de 
facto within Europe during the late medieval period. Later, of course, it 
was reintroduced in the European colonies and only abolished de jure 
and de facto around the mid–nineteenth century. The elimination of 
slavery in Europe was “one of the great landmarks in labor history” 
(Duby 1974, p. 40). This profound change—the early endogenous 
elimination of slavery—did not occur in many Muslim countries, where 
legal slavery remained until after World War II. Some Muslim countries 
abolished slavery as late as 1962, and the institution still exists de facto 
in various contemporary Muslim countries (Lewis 1990; Segal 2001).
Why did the Christian world lead the Muslim world in abolishing 
slavery? The reason concerns the distinct institutional complexes of the 
two civilizations. The historical roots of this distinction date back to the 
rise of Christianity within the Roman Empire. Since the Roman Empire 
had a unifi ed code of law and a rather effective legal system, Christian-
ity did not have to provide a code of law governing everyday life when 
creating its own communities of believers. Christianity developed as a 
religion of orthodoxy and proper beliefs; in earthly matters, Christians 
followed Roman law and later other secular laws. During the late medi-
eval period, this legacy enabled the new European states to gradually 
reassert control over civil legal matters, including slavery.
Islam followed a very different process, in which Muhammad estab-
lished both a religion and a political, economic, and social unit. Islam 
therefore had to provide and oblige adherents to follow the Islamic code 
of law, Sharia law. Like Judaism, therefore, Islam is a religion that regu-
lates its adherents’ behavior in their everyday economic, political, and 
social lives.
The Christian and Islamic holy scriptures discuss behavior toward 
slaves, giving it moral legitimacy (see, e.g., Leviticus 25:46, Ephesians 
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6; Quran 16:71, 4:36, 30:28). But in each civilization, the institutions 
governing slavery were part of distinct institutional complexes. In the 
Christian world, laws governing slavery fell within the institutional 
complex, at the center of which were legal and political organizations. 
Given the European tradition of man-made law, abolishing slavery did 
not alter the central organization, beliefs, or norms of Christianity.
This was not true in the Islamic world, where slavery was part of 
an institutional complex at the center of which were beliefs regarding 
the holiness of religious law. The legal tradition in Islam considers law 
as “the moral status of an act in the eyes of God” while “assessing 
the moral status of human acts was the work of the [religious] jurists” 
(Crone 2004, p. 9). Sharia law recognized slavery; thus, abolishing it 
implied an action that contradicted a central internalized belief of Mus-
lims—that the Sharia is a sacred law sanctioned by God. Abolishing 
slavery challenged the faith’s moral authority, the legal authority of the 
Sharia, and the stature and power of those responsible for administrat-
ing it.17 A diffi culty in abolishing slavery was that “from a Muslim point 
of view, to forbid what God permits is almost as great an offense as to 
permit what God forbids—and slavery was authorized and regulated by 
the holy law” (Lewis 1990, p. 78). The institutional elements relevant 
to slavery were central to Muslim religious beliefs.
Past institutional elements provide opportunities as well as con-
straints in the process of institutional change for able rule makers. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt insisted that the U.S. Social Security system be 
defi ned as insurance and not a welfare system. This was much more 
than semantic. Framing the issue in a way that linked the system to 
beliefs associated with the institution of insurance (the belief that one 
has the right to be paid after paying one’s premiums) was intentional. 
Roosevelt knew that this would render Social Security self-enforcing in 
a larger set of circumstances in the future (Romer 1996).
Effective rules also change cultural and social features, which, in 
turn, infl uence what other rules can be effectively enacted. Consider, for 
example, the case of premodern Venice, which, unlike Genoa, devised 
rules that reduced, over time, the political importance of clans and fos-
tered beliefs in cooperation rather than confrontation. The history of 
Venice during its early days parallels Genoa’s. After an initial period of 
interclan cooperation, Venetian history was characterized by interclan 
rivalries over capturing the offi ce of the Doge (Lane 1973; Norwich 
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1977). Originally the Doge was a Byzantine offi cial, but shortly after 
Venice was established in 679, the post became that of an elected mon-
arch. For the next few hundred years, clans fought in Venice for control 
of the Doge’s post. As in Genoa, economic cooperation was hindered 
by the lack of an institution to contain interclan rivalry.
Changes around the Mediterranean increased the cost of these con-
frontations. Toward the end of the eleventh century, the decline of Byz-
antine naval power increased the gains to the Venetians, leading to the 
formation of a political institution enabling cooperation. As a response 
to this opportunity, they established a new self-enforcing institution. At 
its center was the belief that clans would join together to fi ght against 
any renegade clan that would attempt to gain political dominance over 
the city and its economic resources. This belief was sustained by a set of 
rules whose prescribed behavior was made self-enforcing by that belief. 
The rules limited the Doge’s power to distribute economic and political 
rents, curtailed each clan’s ability to infl uence the election of a Doge (or 
any other offi cer), established tight administrative control over gains 
from interclan political cooperation, and allocated rents fairly among 
all the important Venetian clans so that all had a share regardless of 
clan affi liation. This allocative rule therefore did not provide clans with 
incentives to increase their military strength and plan interclan military 
confl icts.
The belief that clans would join together to confront those that 
attempted to use military power to gain control over the city was made 
self-enforceable because each clan had a stake in the implementation of 
these rules. But these rules and the associated beliefs were also reinforc-
ing: they provided clans with few incentives to invest their resources in 
fortifying their residences or instilling norms of clan loyalty in their 
members rather than loyalty to the city.
There was therefore a positive feedback from rules to culture. By 
weakening the clans and fostering a common Venetian identity, Ven-
ice’s republican magistracy over time increased the range of situa-
tions in which it was self-enforcing. This institution also prevented the 
endogenous formation of a political faction among nonnoble elements 
of the city, the popoli, because the magistracy as an institution did not 
motivate clans to establish patronage networks that would have chan-
neled rents from political control over Venice’s overseas possessions to 
nonnoble clans.18 
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Similar interplay between state-mandated rules and cleavage struc-
tures operate in modern states (Greif and Laitin 2004). Rules refl ect 
existing social structures and cultural beliefs, which, in turn, repro-
duce these structures. In newly independent Nigeria, which gained its 
independence in 1960, political parties were regionally based, and they 
catered to the needs and aspirations of the majority tribal groups in 
their regions. In the Western region, the Action Group catered to the 
interests of the dominant Yoruba population, and Yorubas largely asso-
ciated themselves as supporters of that party. Within the Yoruba region, 
factions of the Action Group represented the interests of Yoruba’s sub-
tribes, associated with different ancestral cities. Similarly, the NPC, the 
party of the Northern Region, catered to Hausa interests, and the NCNC, 
the party of the Eastern Region, catered to Ibo interests. We can sum-
marize the dominant cleavage structure of newly independent Nigeria 
as tribally based, with three principal groups dividing the political pie.
In Nigeria, political leaders present platforms and lists of candi-
dates that refl ect the interests of nationality constituencies, and voters 
tend to respond to symbols and messages that speak to them as mem-
bers of a particular tribal or nationality group. This cleavage structure is 
sustained by beliefs that have been dubbed “everyday primordialism” 
(Fearon and Laitin 2000). Primordialism refl ects the belief that ethnic or 
nationality differences are biologically established and ultimately more 
important than any other possible identifi cation when it comes to social, 
political, or economic transactions. Primordial beliefs of this sort are 
hardly universal and were inherited from Nigeria’s history. They were 
created and sustained under previous political structures. British colo-
nialism ruled “indirectly” through tribal chiefs, who were paid by the 
British colonial state. These tribal chiefs were granted levels of author-
ity they had rarely achieved in the precolonial period, and Nigerians 
had to petition through tribal authority structures to get a hearing from 
the British overrulers. Thus, colonialism played an important role in 
delineating tribal boundaries, clarifying tribal cleavages, and generat-
ing primordial beliefs.
Federal institutions that were built into the constitution rati-
fi ed at the time of independence responded to the existing cleavages 
and beliefs. Political distributions were made based on formulae that 
returned federal funds to the original three regions. In 1967, the eastern 
region (whose leaders were opposed to the formula for the distribution 
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of newly gained oil revenues) attempted secession, but the region lost 
a bloody three-year war fought against federal forces. Subsequently, 
several minority tribes were given their own federal units (then called 
states). Each of the 12 states had a budget supported in large part by 
federally collected oil revenues. Since each state got a base allocation 
to cover the provision of public goods, smaller and smaller nationality 
groups, spurred by this incentive, demanded their own states. By 1999, 
there were 36 separate states, almost all dominated by a single tribal 
group.
While the above discussion emphasizes the importance of social 
structures and cultural beliefs, the same argument can be made regard-
ing norms. Laws protecting labor evolved in Europe for various eco-
nomic and political reasons following World War II. After prevailing 
for a long period, however, such laws began to be viewed by people not 
as a protection but as an entitlement. As the recent labor riots in France 
indicate, this drastically altered the ability of the state to change them 
by fi at. These laws became a right, not a privilege.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This chapter provides a sketch of a theory of action (Greif 1994, 
2006) that accommodates both formal-rule and culturally driven behav-
ior. In both cases, the same social factors—rules, beliefs, and norms that 
often manifest themselves as organizations (social structures)—gener-
ate regularities of behavior. This theory of action does not presuppose 
that behavior is formal-rule or culturally driven. It restricts the set of 
permissible behavior by requiring that each individual is guided, able, 
and motivated to adopt a certain behavior, given the social factors infl u-
encing his actions, while these social factors must be reproduced in a 
similar manner.
From this perspective, asking whether society or the state is more 
important in determining economic outcomes understates the complex-
ity of studying the sources of economic behavior. Society and state 
intertwine in generating behavior. In particular, for the formal-rule 
approach to infl uence behavior, the state has to be suffi ciently effective 
in formulating and disseminating rules and creating the self-enforcing 
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and reproducing beliefs, norms, and organizations that are required to 
motivate and enable the corresponding behavior. Yet, society—its cul-
tural beliefs, norms, networks, and other social structures—infl uences a 
state’s effectiveness in achieving this task. The ability to institute rule-
driven behavior is affected by culturally driven behavior. The converse 
also holds: effective formal rules shape society.
It is suffi cient to note that a functioning state is an outcome, and 
its ability to formulate rules depends on the cultural beliefs of various 
groups regarding not only their interests but also the goals and expected 
behavior of other groups. The diffi culties in creating a functioning gov-
ernment in Iraq after the American occupation reveal the extent of this 
problem. Similarly, compliance with state-mandated rules depends on 
cultural beliefs and norms regarding sources of legitimacy, appropriate 
behavior, and obligations toward kin and members of other social struc-
tures, such as tribes and ethnic groups. The limits the modern state faces 
in ensuring compliance to formal rules in the absence of complemen-
tary beliefs and norms is well refl ected in the large size of the informal 
sector and the prevalence of corruption in many modern economies.
Studying the many varieties of capitalism is an important line of 
research in comparative political economy and sociology (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). Focusing on developing countries, this research has suc-
cessfully examined the distinct formal rules that enabled various types 
of capitalism to fl ourish. The argument presented above suggests that a 
complementary useful line of analysis would be to explore the common 
factors in these societies that render these formal rules relatively effec-
tive in infl uencing behavior. Such an investigation would be likely to 
enhance our understanding of why capitalism—in any form—has failed 
to emerge in so many societies, leaving their members in relative, if not 
absolute, poverty. 
Notes
 1. The discussion in this chapter draws on Greif (2006) and, more generally, on an 
approach to institutional analysis known as comparative and historical institu-
tional analysis. For related discussions of this approach, see also Greif (1997, 
1998) and Aoki (2001).
  2. Barzel (1989), North (1990), Eggertsson (1990), Furubotn and Richter (1997), and 
Williamson (1985, 1996) are classic expositions in economics.
  3. This approach is sociological in nature because it accommodates the four main 
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distinctions between the economic and the sociological views as summarized by 
Smelser and Swedberg (1994, pp. 4–8) in the Handbook of Economic Sociology. 
The socioeconomic perspective does not presuppose methodological individual-
ism (namely, that actors’ preferences can always be studied as uninfl uenced by 
the actions of others); rather, it holds that the allocation of resources refl ects only 
formal rationality adopted in neoclassical economics, that social structures and 
meaning are not important in constraining behavior, and that the economy is not an 
integral part of the society. As a matter of fact, the perspective adopted here—as is 
now so common in economics in general—accepts that preferences and rationality 
are socially constructed, that social structures and meaning are important, and that 
the economy is an integral part of the society and has to be studied accordingly.
  4. In a sense, this analysis follows a well-established sociological tradition (e.g., 
Berger and Luckmann [1967]) by concentrating on the social construction of what 
each individual considers the environment in which he acts.
  5.  I use the term system to highlight the interrelations among an institution’s various 
elements, but an institution that need not have all of the elements of the system 
(rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations).
  6. The term guide, in this case, means to provide the knowledge required to take and 
coordinate a particular action. The term motivate here means to induce behavior 
based on external or intrinsic rewards and punishments.
  7. Scott (1995, p. 33) advances a different, nonunitary notion of institutions, accord-
ing to which institutions “consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative struc-
tures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior.” Chapter 
5 clarifi es the relationships between the two defi nitions.
  8. Sociologists have explored this foundation (for reviews, see Wrong [1999] and 
Scott [1995]). Its importance has also been stressed by many prominent econo-
mists, including Akerlof (1984), Arrow (1981), Becker (1974), Hirshleifer (1985), 
Lal (1998), North (1990), Platteau (1994), and Samuelson (1993).
  9.  Psychologists defi ne an intrinsically motivated act as one that is taken without any 
reward but the value of the action itself (see Frey [1997], pp. 13–14).
  10.  On norms and their transmission, see Cavalli-Sforza, Luca, and Feldman (1981); 
Davis (1949); and Witt (1986).
  11. I use the term norms to note both the values specifying the preferred or the desir-
able (e.g., winning the game) and norms specifying the legitimate means of 
achieving these goals (e.g., winning by playing fair).
  12. The classical game-theoretic framework, for example, assumes a complete model 
and common knowledge and focuses on equilibrium strategies played by highly 
rational individuals. This corresponds to a situation in which institutionalized 
rules that aggregate private knowledge and information provide shared cognition, 
information, and coordination. The analysis thus restricts the set of admissible 
rules, beliefs, and behavior to those in which each limitedly rational individual, 
responding to the cognitive, coordinative, and informational content of the insti-
tutionalized rules, follows the behavior expected of him. In situations in which an 
institution generates behavior, the knowledge and information that are compressed 
into the institutionalized rules enable and guide individuals, despite their limited 
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perception, knowledge, and computational ability, to act in a manner that leads 
to behavior (and refl ects the constraints on admissible beliefs and behavior) that 
the game-theoretic equilibrium analysis captures. Classical game theory can be 
usefully employed to study situations in which it is reasonable to assert that social 
rules were institutionalized. See Greif (2006, Chapter 5).
 13. For an extensive recent discussion, see Greif (2006), Chapters 10–11 and the ref-
erences therein.
 14.  The focus here is only on the issue of endogenous institutional change due to 
self-reinforcement and undermining, but the above observations regarding the 
nature of institutions, institutionalized rules, and beliefs also enable addressing 
related issues—e.g., intentional, coordinated action by individuals to change oth-
ers’ beliefs, draw attention to change, coordinate actions by some to infl uence 
others’ optimal behavior, and establish organizations to foster or halt reinforce-
ment or undermining.
 15. On cultural beliefs in general, see, for example, Davis (1949, in particular pp. 
52ff., 192ff.). Regarding their importance in infl uencing institutional change, see 
Greif (1994) and Nee and Ingram (1998).
  16. Even symbols, terms, and gestures associated with past institutions, such as “sign-
ing a contract” or “the crown,” infl uence institutional selection. They constitute 
commonly known external representations of encapsulated knowledge on which 
individuals condition their behavior. Sociologists have long emphasized the 
importance of a shared cultural understanding (script, cognition, or interpretive 
frames) in constraining the behavior that leads to new institutions by determining 
what actors can conceive (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Dobbin 1994; Meyer and 
Rowan 1991; Scott 1995).
 17. I do not argue that the laws specifi ed in the Sharia were static and immutable to 
change. This defi nitely was not the case. The argument is that different constraints 
and opportunities for legal changes exist in societies with and without religious 
law. More broadly, legal dynamics are distinct among systems in which the law 
has different normative contents and in which different decision makers infl uence 
legal development.
 18.  This group had been extended several times to absorb emerging nonnoble fami-
lies. The system therefore had the fl exibility required for its perpetuation.
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